

## The Honorable James L. Robart

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

PARS EQUALITY CENTER;  
ONEAMERICA; PAMELA  
WHITEHALL RAGHEBI; AFSHIN  
RAGHEBI; ZEINAB MOHAMED  
HASSAN; SIRAJI ETHA SIRAJI;  
MALAYEEN AHMED; REZA AZIMI;  
YAHYA GHALEB; MITRA  
HANNANI; NICHOLAS HANOUT;  
HOSSEIN ZAMANI HOSSEINABADI;  
HODA MEHRABI  
MOHAMMADABADI; JOHN DOES  
#1-3; and JANE DOE #1.

## Plaintiffs,

V.

MIKE POMPEO; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN;  
KEVIN K. MCALLENAN; U.S.  
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND  
SECURITY; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
STATE; and U.S. CUSTOMS AND  
BORDER PROTECTION.

## Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:18-cv-01122-JLR

## **DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS**

**NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:  
October 26, 2018**

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

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## INTRODUCTION

2 Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for  
3 Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,  
4 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (“Proclamation”), suspends entry into the United States of  
5 certain foreign nationals, while also permitting discretionary waivers of the Proclamation’s entry  
6 restrictions. In *Trump v. Hawaii*, the Supreme Court upheld the Proclamation, rejecting the  
7 argument that the Proclamation was invalid because its waiver process was artificial. 138 S. Ct.  
8 2392, 2422-23 & n.7 (2018). Nonetheless, in this putative class action, Plaintiffs bring a collateral  
9 attack against the Proclamation by challenging the waiver process. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs  
10 assert that visa applicants have been denied waivers without first receiving notice of the  
11 availability of a waiver or first being granted consular interviews or other opportunities to provide  
12 evidence of waiver eligibility. They also assert that a higher standard of proof for waiver eligibility  
13 has been imposed on visa applicants than required by the Proclamation, and that consular officers  
14 have lacked discretion in making waiver determinations. In short, Plaintiffs claim that individuals  
15 subject to the Proclamation have been denied a “consistent” or “meaningful” process by which  
16 they might establish their eligibility for a waiver.  
17  
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19 Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed because they fail to state any claim on which  
20 relief can be granted. An executive order, such as the Proclamation, does not create individually  
21 enforceable rights, and Plaintiffs do not point to any statutory provision or regulation that would  
22 supply them with a valid cause of action. Far from creating a private cause of action, the  
23 Proclamation expressly precludes judicial review over adjudications of visa applications, which in  
24 any event are not justiciable under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. The consular  
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26 || DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 nonreviewability doctrine, moreover, is a necessary corollary of the principle that the political  
 2 Branches have plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who  
 3 do not qualify under those rules, which render the procedures instituted pursuant to the  
 4 Proclamation largely immune from judicial review. As to Plaintiffs' due process claim, the  
 5 Supreme Court has held that the Proclamation, including its waiver provisions, was a lawful  
 6 exercise of the President's discretion, and Plaintiffs do not have a liberty or property interest in the  
 7 grant of a discretionary waiver. Moreover, even if such an interest existed, Defendants have  
 8 afforded all the process that is due. Lastly, any challenges to the waiver process, guidance, and  
 9 adjudications are meritless as they are confuted by the Proclamation's express terms, public  
 10 information, the Supreme Court's holding in *Hawaii*, and the actual grants of waivers. For these  
 11 reasons, Defendants respectfully ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.

13 **LEGAL BACKGROUND**

14 **I. The Visa Process**

15 Foreign nationals seeking visas to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry  
 16 must complete a process prescribed by the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which places  
 17 on the visa applicant the burden of establishing eligibility to receive a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1361. When  
 18 a visa application is properly executed before a consular officer, the consular officer must either  
 19 issue or refuse the visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) or § 1201(g) or other applicable law. 22 C.F.R.  
 20 §§ 41.121 (nonimmigrant visas), 42.81(a) (immigrant visas). Section 1201(g) instructs that no visa  
 21 can issue if (1) the applicant is ineligible under § 1182, (2) the visa application does not comply  
 22 with applicable statutes or regulations, or (3) the consular officer "has reason to believe" that the  
 23 alien applicant is ineligible for a visa "under . . . any other provision of law." Thus, when a consular  
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26 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

1 officer needs more information to adjudicate an application—such as information regarding  
 2 whether the applicant poses a national security risk—the consular officer must deny the visa  
 3 application until such information is received.<sup>1</sup> *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). The decision to grant or  
 4 deny a visa application, with limited exception, rests solely with the consular officer. *See* 8 U.S.C.  
 5 § 1201(a)(1); 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.111, 41.121, 42.71, 42.81; *see also* 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)-(c)  
 6 (authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of State to direct the refusal of  
 7 visas in certain circumstances).

8       The Department of State has promulgated internal guidance for consular officers. Not all  
 9 of this information is public, given the need to protect national security and the integrity of the  
 10 visa adjudication process—for instance, so that foreign nationals cannot structure their  
 11 applications so as to avoid revealing potentially derogatory information. *See Almaklani v. Nielsen*,  
 12 No. 1:18-cv-00398-NGG-CLP (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018), Order Granting Government’s Motion  
 13 to Seal (Dkt. 41) (attached as Ex. A) at 6.

14 **II. The Presidential Proclamation and Waiver Adjudications**

15       The Proclamation exercises the President’s authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) to suspend  
 16 entry into the United States of nationals of certain countries, subject to exceptions and  
 17 discretionary case-by-case waivers. The legality of the Proclamation has already been before the  
 18 Supreme Court, which held in *Hawaii* that the President, after a worldwide, multi-agency review,  
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 21       <sup>1</sup> In addition, nationals of a country designated as a state sponsor of international terrorism  
 22 (currently, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria) may not be issued a nonimmigrant visa “unless  
 23 the Secretary of State determines, in consultation with the [Secretary of Homeland Security] and  
 24 the heads of other appropriate United States agencies, that such alien does not pose a threat to the  
 25 safety or national security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1735(a).

26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

1 permissibly exercised his broad discretion under the INA in issuing the Proclamation. 138 S. Ct.  
 2 at 2408.

3 At issue here is the Proclamation's limited waiver provision, which provides, in relevant  
 4 part, that consular officers may, in their discretion, grant waivers on a case-by-case basis to visa  
 5 applicants. Proclamation, § 3(c). Visa applicants bear the burden of demonstrating to a consular  
 6 officer that a waiver would be appropriate by establishing that (1) denying entry would cause the  
 7 foreign national undue hardship, (2) entry would not pose a threat to the national security or public  
 8 safety of the United States, and (3) entry would be in the national interest. *Id.* § 3(c)(i).<sup>2</sup> In addition,  
 9 the Proclamation directs the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to adopt guidance for  
 10 consular officers' determinations to issue waivers. *Id.* Nothing in the Proclamation requires that  
 11 the guidance be made public. *Id.*

12 On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court stayed injunctions that had blocked application  
 13 of the Proclamation in substantial part. *See Hawaii v. Trump*, 138 S. Ct. 542 (Mem.) (Dec. 4,  
 14 2017). The State Department thereafter fully implemented the Proclamation, and consular officers  
 15 subsequently denied visa applications under the Proclamation and began considering applicants  
 16 for waivers of the Proclamation. Over time, the State Department has provided updated public  
 17 information on the waiver adjudication process. *See generally* U.S. Department of State - Bureau  
 18 of Consular Affairs, June 26 Supreme Court Decision on Presidential Proclamation 9645 (last  
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 21  
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24 <sup>2</sup> Section 3(c)(iv)(A) lists examples of when a discretionary waiver might be appropriate,  
 25 such as when the foreign national seeks to reside with a close family member, obtain urgent  
 medical care, or pursue significant business obligations.

26 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 visited Oct. 2, 2018) (“State Dep’t Website”).<sup>3</sup> As of September 30, 2018, 1,836 visa applicants  
 2 who are ineligible for visas pursuant to the Proclamation have been granted waivers of its  
 3 restrictions. *Id.*

4 When adjudicating the visa application of an alien subject to the Proclamation, a consular  
 5 officer must first determine whether the applicant is eligible for a visa under the INA. *See id.* If  
 6 the applicant is found to be eligible for a visa in all other respects, the consular officer must then  
 7 determine whether the applicant qualifies for an exception to the Proclamation. *See id.* If the  
 8 applicant does not qualify for an exception, the consular officer considers whether the applicant is  
 9 eligible for a waiver. *See id.*

11 All applicants denied visas based on the Proclamation are automatically considered for a  
 12 waiver under section 3(c) of the Proclamation. *See id.* As explained in the State Department’s  
 13 public guidance, applicants are not required to complete any separate form; instead, consular  
 14 officers use the applicant’s visa application and information gathered during the visa application  
 15 interview in considering waiver eligibility. *Id.* Additionally, during the visa interview, applicants  
 16 should disclose “any information that might demonstrate that he or she is eligible for a waiver.”  
 17 *Id.*

19 The Proclamation provides several examples of circumstances that might give rise to undue  
 20 hardship—the first criterion for waiver eligibility—such as cases where a foreign national seeks  
 21 to enter the United States for urgent medical care. Proclamation, § 3(c)(iv); *see also* State Dep’t  
 22

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23  
 24 <sup>3</sup> Available at [https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/presidential-proclamation-archive/june\\_26\\_supreme\\_court\\_decision\\_on\\_presidential\\_proclamation9645.html](https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/presidential-proclamation-archive/june_26_supreme_court_decision_on_presidential_proclamation9645.html).  
 25

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1 Website. If the consular officer determines at the time of the visa application interview that a  
 2 waiver is not appropriate because either or both of the undue hardship and national interest criteria  
 3 have not been met, the consular officer will refuse a visa at that time and inform the applicant that  
 4 his visa application will not be further considered for a waiver. If, however, the consular officer  
 5 determines that the applicant satisfies the first two criteria and a waiver might be appropriate, the  
 6 officer will deny the visa application under the Proclamation and inform the applicant that his  
 7 request for a waiver is undergoing further processing. The consular officer will then consult with  
 8 the Visa Office to check whether the applicant poses a threat to national security or public safety.  
 9 State Dep’t Website. Because the countries subject to the Proclamation generally have inadequate  
 10 information-sharing and document-control protocols, individualized assessments of their nationals  
 11 may be time-consuming and resource-intensive. *See id.* If no threat is identified, a consular officer  
 12 may, in his discretion, with the concurrence of a consular manager, issue a visa on the basis of a  
 13 waiver. *Id.*

## 15 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

16 Plaintiffs include petitioners in the United States with approved family-based immigrant  
 17 visa petitions who seek to be reunited with family member beneficiaries who are nationals of Iran,  
 18 Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen, are subject to the Proclamation, and are currently awaiting  
 19 decisions on waivers or have been denied waivers (the “U.S. Petitioner Subclass”). Complaint  
 20 (Dkt. 1) ¶ 269. Plaintiffs also include nationals of the aforementioned countries who applied for  
 21 and were denied family-based, diversity, fiancée, tourist, and investor visas under the Proclamation  
 22 or are awaiting decisions on their applications for such visas (the “Visa Applicant Subclass”). *Id.*  
 23 ¶¶ 27-42, 269. Those plaintiffs seek to enter the United States for a wide variety of reasons and  
 24

25 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 describe hardships they have encountered and anticipate in the future if their entry is further  
 2 delayed. *See id.* ¶¶ 163-254. Plaintiffs have brought this suit as a putative class action, but the only  
 3 common feature is Plaintiffs' allegation that they were either denied waivers or have waiver  
 4 applications currently pending.<sup>4</sup>

#### 5 **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

6 A court should dismiss a case under Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint fails to state a claim on  
 7 which relief may be granted. Dismissal is required if the facts pleaded fail to describe a claim that  
 8 is plausible on its face. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the court takes well-  
 9 pleaded allegations as true, this "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." *Id.* Thus, "[t]hreadbare  
 10 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not  
 11 suffice." *Id.* And where a plaintiff fails to allege a valid cause of action, the case should be  
 12 dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). *See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 640 F. App'x  
 13 617, 620 (9th Cir. 2016).

14 In addition to the factual allegations of the complaint, a court may consider "documents  
 15 attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of  
 16 judicial notice . . ." *United States v. Ritchie*, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). A court may also  
 17

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 19  
 20<sup>4</sup> Paradoxically, despite requesting appointment as and agreeing to take on the duties of class  
 21 representatives, several Plaintiffs applied for and received authorization to withhold their true  
 22 identities from the public and the very unnamed putative class members they seek to represent.  
 23 ECF Nos. 20, 51. In addition, those same Plaintiffs have withheld their identities from Defendants,  
 24 thus prejudicing Defendants in their defense of this case. In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
 25 10(a)'s requirement that parties identify themselves in their pleadings, the heavy burden that a  
 26 party must satisfy before he may conceal his identity from the public and especially from an  
 opposing party, and the prejudice that will inure to Defendants if they are unable to investigate,  
 among other things, the Doe Plaintiffs' qualifications to serve as class representatives, Defendants  
 intend to file a motion to reconsider.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

1 take judicial notice of “some public records, including the records and reports of administrative  
 2 bodies.” *Id.* at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 **ARGUMENT**

4 **I. Plaintiffs’ challenge to the implementation of the waiver provision of the  
 5 Proclamation is not justiciable.**

6 Plaintiffs challenge the implementation of the waiver provision of the Proclamation,  
 7 claiming that the internal and public guidance documents issued by the State Department are not  
 8 in accordance with the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.  
 9 § 706(2)(C). *See* Complaint (Dkt. 1) ¶ 285. That challenge, however, is precluded by the APA and  
 10 the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, and also precluded where there are no meaningful  
 11 standards to apply to executive actions implementing an executive order such as the Proclamation.  
 12

13 **A. Plaintiffs’ claims are precluded by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.**

14 In their Complaint, although Plaintiffs purport to limit their challenge to Defendants’  
 15 procedural implementation of Section 3(c) of the Proclamation, Plaintiffs also inherently challenge  
 16 the individual decisions of consular officers denying visas and finding applicants ineligible for  
 17 waivers of ineligibility. *E.g.*, Complaint (Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 5 (claiming “mass denials of waivers”); 13  
 18 (referring to plaintiffs who “have been denied waivers and visas”); 101-03 (asserting that  
 19 potentially thousands of waiver denials were issued “via standardized form letters”); 113, 129  
 20 (claiming that “denials of waivers and visas” contravene certain regulations and have “caused  
 21 widespread consternation and confusion”); 222 (describing waiver denials as “perfunctory”).  
 22

23 Courts have recognized that visa adjudications are immune from judicial review under the  
 24 longstanding doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which applies regardless of the manner in  
 25

26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 which the executive branch denies entry to an alien abroad. *See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy*,  
 2 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (“[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized  
 3 by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given  
 4 alien.”); *Doan v. INS*, 160 F.3d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Administrative decisions excluding  
 5 aliens are not subject to judicial review unless there is a clear grant of authority by statute.”);  
 6 *Saavedra Bruno v. Albright*, 197 F.3d 1153, 1158-63 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (affirming district  
 7 court’s decision that it could not entertain plaintiff’s suit challenging the denial and revocation of  
 8 two separate visas given “the political nature of visa determinations” and “lack of any statute  
 9 expressly authorizing judicial review of consular officers’ actions”).

10 Plaintiffs’ claims challenging individual waiver denials must also be dismissed pursuant to  
 11 consular nonreviewability because the decision to deny a waiver is part of the decision to deny a  
 12 visa application. Proclamation, § 3(c); *Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2412, 2414, 2422-23 (noting that  
 13 section 1182(f), upon which the Proclamation was based, vests authority in the President to impose  
 14 additional limitations on entry beyond the grounds set forth in the INA and that the waiver process  
 15 is part of that eligibility determination); *see also Van Ravenswaay v. Napolitano*, 61 F. Supp. 2d  
 16 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2009) (plaintiff challenged denial of non-immigrant B-1 visa after his request for a  
 17 waiver of the visa denial was denied). Notably, in *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972),  
 18 one of the seminal cases on consular nonreviewability, the Supreme Court specifically applied the  
 19 principles of the doctrine to bar review of the Attorney General’s refusal to waive the visa  
 20 applicant’s inadmissibility.

21 The doctrine of consular nonreviewability, long recognized by the Supreme Court,  
 22 preceded passage of the APA and “represents one of” those areas “in which legislative action [and]

23 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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traditional practice indicate that courts are unqualified or that issues are inappropriate for judicial determination.” *Saavedra Bruno*, 197 F.3d at 1160 (citation omitted; brackets in original); *see also Allen v. Milas*, 896 F.3d 1094, 1107 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting a claim brought under the APA that a consular decision was arbitrary and capricious); *see also Mandel*, 408 U.S. at 762, 766; *Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. at 543-44. According to the Ninth Circuit, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability “predates [even] the founding of our Republic” and “stems from” the principle that “the legislative power of Congress over the admission of aliens is virtually complete.” *Capistrano v. Dep’t of State*, 267 F. App’x 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting *Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin*, 800 F.2d 970, 970 (9th Cir. 1986)). That pronouncement “aligns [the Ninth Circuit] with courts nationwide,” *id.*: the Second Circuit, for instance, has held that “[i]t is settled that the judiciary will not interfere with the *visa-issuing process*,” *Wan Shih Hsieh v. Kiley*, 569 F.2d 1179, 1181 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added), while the District of Columbia Circuit has unequivocally held that “[w]hen it comes to matters touching on national security or foreign affairs—and visa determinations are such matters—the presumption of review ‘runs aground,’” *Saavedra Bruno*, 197 F.3d at 1162 (quoting *Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)). And in *Mandel*, the Supreme Court affirmed that “[t]he power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by [its] previous adjudications.” 408 U.S. at 766 (quoting *Lem Moon Sing v. United States*, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895)); *see also Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker*, 953 F.2d 1498, 1507 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The foregoing cases [involving requests to review visa determinations by consular officers] evidence Congress’s intent

26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 to preclude judicial review of administrative determinations concerning aliens who have never  
 2 presented themselves at the borders of the country. Review under the APA would be inconsistent  
 3 with that intent.”).

4 The Ninth Circuit recently held that consular decisions are not subject to APA review and  
 5 that a court may review such decisions only as constitutional challenges “under the limited *Mandel*  
 6 standard.” *Allen*, 896 F.3d at 1097, 1106-09 (“[T]he only standard by which we can review the  
 7 merits of a consular officer’s denial of a visa is for constitutional error, where the visa application  
 8 is denied without a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason.”). The consular nonreviewability  
 9 doctrine extends even to U.S. citizen plaintiffs, who are equally precluded from asserting such  
 10 APA claims. *Saavedra Bruno*, 197 F.3d at 1164 (Neither “aliens seeking review of adverse  
 11 consular decisions” nor “United States citizens sponsoring their admission” are entitled to judicial  
 12 review.); *Li Hing*, 800 F.2d at 970

14 Further, given the expansive principles underpinning consular nonreviewability, the  
 15 doctrine sweeps so broadly as to apply “even where it is alleged that the consular officer failed to  
 16 follow regulations,” “where the applicant challenges the validity of the regulations on which the  
 17 decision was based,” where the decision is alleged to have been based on a factual, procedural, or  
 18 legal error, or where the applicant challenges “the process followed.” *Chun v. Powell*, 223 F. Supp.  
 19 2d 204, 206 (D.D.C. 2002) (citations omitted); *see Capistrano*, 267 F. App’x at 594-95 (“That the  
 20 Appellants characterize their complaint as one challenging the process followed by the consulate  
 21 rather than its ultimate decision does not exempt the case from this well-settled doctrine.”).<sup>5</sup>

24<sup>5</sup> *See also De Castro v. Fairman*, 164 F. App’x 930, 932-33 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding  
 25 doctrine applies to claims that visa denial “was not based on any evidence” and “constituted legal

26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Indeed, courts have repeatedly rejected “attempts to circumvent the doctrine by claiming [plaintiffs are] not seeking a review of the consular officer’s decision, but [are] challenging some other, related aspect of the decision.” *Malyutin v. Rice*, 677 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing cases), *summarily aff’d* No. 10-5015, 2010 WL 2710451 (D.C. Cir. July 6, 2010), *cert denied*, 562 U.S. 1140 (2011); *Van Ravenswaay*, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 3-5 (finding statutory waivers to visa denials to be discretionary decisions that are barred from judicial review by the INA). Thus, even if Plaintiffs’ challenge is characterized “as one challenging the process followed [in relation to adjudicating their visa applications consistently with the Proclamation] rather than [any] ultimate decision” rendered by a consular officer, this case is not “exempt[ed]” from the principles of the consular nonreviewability doctrine. *Capistrano*, 267 F. App’x at 594.

To appreciate the connection between challenges to the procedure by which visa applications are adjudicated and to the actual adjudications themselves, one only need look at Plaintiffs’ claims for relief. Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare that the actions of Defendants (including officers and agents of the State Department “involved in deciding whether a waiver

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error”); *Ventura-Escamilla v. INS*, 647 F.2d 28, 32 (9th Cir. 1981); *Hussein v. Beecroft*, No. 17-cv-12356, 2018 WL 3574717, at \*6 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2018) (“Whether or not the consular officer disregarded other information submitted by petitioners—unreasonably, or even unlawfully—is of no consequence to *this case*[.]” (emphasis in original)); *Rodgers v. Lynch*, No. 16-cv-4398, 2016 WL 10966384, at \*2 & n.4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016) (applying doctrine to challenges to the consular officer’s manner of considering the application for a waiver); *ZigZag, LLC v. Kerry*, No. 14-cv-14118, 2015 WL 1061503, at \*4 (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 2015) (applying doctrine to procedural challenge that the consular officer did not properly interview the applicant); *Toor v. Clinton*, No. 1:09-cv-279, 2009 WL 1582900, at \*5 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 4, 2009) (applying doctrine to the process by which the U.S. Embassy reconsiders a visa application); *Nwansi v. Rice*, No. 06-cv-0003, 2006 WL 2032578, at \*3-5 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 18, 2006) (finding doctrine applies to challenges to violations of State Department guidelines); *Ruston*, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 522-23 (finding claims challenging failure to provide notice of intent to revoke visa immune from judicial review).

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 should be granted”—thus, including consular officers) have been arbitrary, capricious, and  
 2 unlawful. Complaint (Dkt. 1) at 65 (prayer for relief). To make any such declaration, however,  
 3 would require the Court to review the discretionary determinations of consular officers and judge  
 4 them to have been made in error. *See Capistrano*, 267 F. App'x at 594-95; *Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin*, 800 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1986) (“consular official’s decision to issue or withhold  
 5 a visa is not subject either to administrative or judicial review”). Plaintiffs’ challenges to the  
 6 “procedures” by which they were denied waivers are inextricably intertwined with the actual  
 7 discretionary denials of those same waivers. And as discussed above, “[i]ssuing such relief would  
 8 be exactly what the doctrine of consular nonreviewability prevents [this Court] from doing.” *See*  
 9 *id.* at 595.

12           **B. Plaintiffs’ challenge to Defendants’ actions in implementing the Proclamation is  
 13 not justiciable because there is a lack of meaningful standards against which to  
 14 judge those actions.**

15           Judicial review of the implementation of the Proclamation, including its waiver provisions,  
 16 is additionally unavailable under the APA because executive orders are traditionally unreviewable  
 17 and there would be no standard for the Court to apply where the Proclamation is a lawful exercise  
 18 of the President’s “discretion” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), through an executive order. *Hawaii*,  
 19 138 S. Ct. at 2407-09, 2422-23 & n.7 (“By its terms, § 1182(f) exudes deference to the President  
 20 in every clause” and “grants the President broad *discretion* to suspend the entry of aliens into the  
 21 United States.” (emphasis added)). Courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have consistently held that  
 22 use of the word “may” signifies discretion. *See Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018);  
 23 *Wilson v. C.I.R.*, 705 F.3d 980, 1001 (9th Cir. 2013). And here, the Proclamation specifies that  
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25  
 26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 waivers *may* be granted “in [the agency’s] discretion.” Proclamation, § 3(c); *see also id.* § 9(c) (no  
 2 judicial review clause).

3 Further, even if implementation of the Proclamation’s entry restrictions were not an  
 4 explicitly discretionary function, it involves decisions that are “traditionally” unreviewable, and  
 5 there is simply “no law to apply.” *Lincoln v. Vigil*, 508 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1993); *Heckler v.*  
 6 *Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 830-31 (1985); *see also Haitian Refugee Ctr.*, 953 F.2d at 508 (finding no  
 7 meaningful standard of review because the executive order “in no way limit[ed] the discretion of  
 8 INS officials in their determination of who qualifies as a refugee or the procedures to be used to  
 9 make such a determination”). The Proclamation is broadly worded and does not itself define terms  
 10 such as “undue hardship” or “national interest” with regard to waiver adjudications. Proclamation,  
 11 § 3(c). Instead, just as all visa adjudications call for the exercise of judgment and discretion by  
 12 consular officers, application of the Proclamation’s waiver criteria demands that consular officers  
 13 rely on their own judgment and expertise. Plaintiffs thus are unable to advert to anything that  
 14 would provide a judicially manageable standard against which this Court can determine how and  
 15 when Defendants should exercise their discretion to grant or deny waivers. *See Webster v. Doe*,  
 16 486 U.S. 592, 599-601 (1988); *Ekimian v. INS*, 303 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding  
 17 no judicially reviewable standard to examine BIA’s decision not to reopen a case).

20 Decisions involving the entry of foreign nationals are clearly “the product of political,  
 21 military, economic, or managerial choices that are not readily subject to judicial review.” *Local*  
 22 2855, *AFGE (AFL-CIO) v. United States*, 602 F.2d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1979). When deciding  
 23 whether to grant a waiver, consular officers must balance the national interest, the specific  
 24 concerns raised in the case of each foreign national, and threats to national security and public  
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26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 safety, which are particularly within the agencies' expertise. *See Proclamation*, § 3(c). Such  
 2 choices are reserved to the political branches, not the judiciary. *See Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2415,  
 3 2421-22; *Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.*, 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). As the  
 4 Ninth Circuit recently explained, consular officers do not make “*legal* determinations” easily  
 5 reviewable by a court. *Allen*, 896 F.3d at 1107 & n.3 (emphasis in original) (noting consular  
 6 officers “may or may not have any formal legal training”); *see also Haitian Refugee Ctr.*, 953 F.2d  
 7 at 507-08 (holding that section 701(a)(2) of the APA barred plaintiffs’ challenges to the procedures  
 8 used by the “President’s subordinates” to carry out his executive order issued pursuant to 8 U.S.C.  
 9 § 1182(f)). Accordingly, consular officers’ decisions to grant or deny waivers are “committed to  
 10 agency discretion by law” and thus immune from judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).

12 **II. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for any violation of the Proclamation or agency  
 13 regulations.**

14 Even assuming the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to review the implementation of  
 15 the Proclamation, the Court should dismiss this case in its entirety for failure to state a claim under  
 16 the Proclamation itself, the INA, or any agency regulations on which relief can be granted. In their  
 17 Complaint, Plaintiffs posit that Defendants’ actions in implementing the Proclamation have not  
 18 conformed to certain rules and guidelines set out in the Proclamation, such as “the eligibility  
 19 criteria for a waiver and the exemplar situations in which a waiver may be appropriate,” and thus  
 20 should “be set aside under the principle articulated in *United States ex. rel. Accardi v.*  
 21 *Shaughnessy*, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).” Complaint (Dkt. 1) ¶ 290, 293. Plaintiffs, however, provide  
 22 little support or explanation for their claim, failing to distinguish between regulations, which carry  
 23 the force of law, and proclamations, which, as a general matter, are management tools for  
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 26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 implementing the President's policies, as opposed to legally binding documents that may be  
 2 enforced against the Executive Branch.<sup>6</sup> As the Supreme Court made clear in *Accardi*, “[t]he  
 3 crucial question is whether the alleged conduct of the Attorney General deprived petitioner of any  
 4 of the rights *guaranteed him by the statute or by the regulations issued pursuant thereto.*” 347 U.S.  
 5 at 502 (emphasis added). Thus, here, the applicability of the *Accardi* doctrine hangs on a finding  
 6 that the Proclamation—which, in any event, is not a regulation or a statute—provides Plaintiffs  
 7 with some protectable interest. The Proclamation, however, confers no such enforceable rights.  
 8 Indeed, it is well-settled that “there is no private right of action to enforce obligations imposed on  
 9 executive branch officials by executive orders.” *Chai v. Carroll*, 48 F.3d 1331, 1338 (4th Cir.  
 10 1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted); *see Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc.*, 953 F.2d at  
 11 1510-11 (holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim because the President's executive order  
 12 pursuant to Section 1182(f) did “not give rise to a private cause of action.”), *cert. denied*, 502 U.S.  
 13 1122 (1992); *U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.* (“HHS”),  
 14 844 F.2d 1087, 1095 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); *Chen v. Schiltgen*, No. 94-cv-4094-MHP, 1995 WL  
 15 317023, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 1995) (“It is not the role of this court to ensure that the Attorney  
 16 General complies with the President's directive.”). Because Plaintiffs' suit is not an effort to  
 17 enforce compliance with congressional directives, but “an indirect—and impermissible—attempt  
 18 to enforce” compliance with Executive ones, it should be dismissed. *Air Transport Ass'n of*  
 19 *America v. F.A.A.*, 169 F.3d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1999); *see Haitian Refugee Ctr.*, 953 F.2d at 510-11.  
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<sup>6</sup> The terms “proclamation” and “executive order” are used interchangeably since both are directives or actions by the President.

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 26 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 There is a narrow exception to the general rule that executive orders are not privately  
 2 enforceable, but it does not apply to this case. To be enforceable, an executive order must, at a  
 3 minimum, (1) have a “specific statutory foundation,” (2) “not preclude judicial review,” and  
 4 (3) have “law to apply”—that is, an objective standard by which a court can judge the agency’s  
 5 actions. *City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.*, 123 F.3d 1142, 1166 (9th Cir. 1997).  
 6 Here, the Proclamation is based on 8 U.S.C § 1182(f), which allows the President to “suspend the  
 7 entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry  
 8 of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate,” whenever he finds that such entry would  
 9 be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Thus, while the Proclamation does have a  
 10 “specific statutory foundation,” that foundation, far from setting out any standards to which the  
 11 agencies must conform or allowing of any private causes of action against the Government, simply  
 12 affirms the President’s broad discretion over the admission of aliens to the United States.  
 13

14 As to the second requirement, the Proclamation contains express language precluding  
 15 judicial review. See *Carmel-By-The-Sea*, 123 F.3d at 1166. The Proclamation specifically states  
 16 that it “is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,  
 17 enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies,  
 18 or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.” Proclamation, § 9(c). Courts  
 19 have interpreted similar “no administrative or judicial review” clauses in a proclamation or  
 20 executive order to preclude private enforcement through an APA action. See *Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t  
 21 Emps. v. FLRA*, 204 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 2000); *Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. FLRA*, 179 F.3d  
 22 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1999); *Air Transport Ass’n of America*, 169 F.3d at 8-9; *Meyer v. Bush*,  
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 26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

1 981 F.2d 1288, 1297 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1993); *Dettling v. United States*, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1116,  
 2 1125-26 (D. Haw. 2013).

3 Lastly, with regard to the third requirement, as discussed above, there is no “law to apply”  
 4 or “objective standard” by which a court could judge the agencies’ actions here. *See*  
 5 *Carmel-By-The-Sea*, 123 F.3d at 1166. Specifically, there is no administrative regulation or statute  
 6 by which to measure the State Department’s guidance to a consular officer regarding “national  
 7 security or public safety” and “the national interest” as the officer assesses an applicant’s eligibility  
 8 for a waiver. Proclamation, § 3(c); *Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2412 (explaining that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)  
 9 “vests authority in the President to impose *additional* limitations on entry *beyond* the grounds for  
 10 exclusion set forth in the INA (emphases added)). This is unsurprising, given Congress’s intent to  
 11 vest the Executive with “flexible authority” and “broad discretion” over who is permitted to enter  
 12 the United States. *Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2408, 2415; *see Haitian Refugee Ctr.*, 953 F.2d at 510.  
 13 The Proclamation vests the agencies with authority to carry out the President’s mandate, and it  
 14 directs them to exercise their “discretion” in deciding whether to “grant waivers on a case-by-case  
 15 basis” in light of “individual circumstances,” as opposed to “categorically.” Proclamation, § 3(c).  
 16 Such directives are far from “sufficiently specific and objective” to warrant judicial review of the  
 17 determinations of consular officers implementing the Proclamation—which necessarily implicate  
 18 the Executive’s core foreign-affairs and national-security responsibilities—and also run afoul of  
 19 consular nonreviewability.  
 20

21 In addition to stating no cognizable claim for relief for any violation of the Proclamation  
 22 itself, Plaintiffs are unable to establish that Defendants, in implementing the Proclamation, have  
 23 contravened 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.121 and 42.81, which provide that a consular officer who knows or  
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25 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 has reason to believe a visa applicant is ineligible must inform the alien “whether there is, in law  
 2 or regulations, a mechanism (such as a waiver) to overcome the refusal.” As explained above, all  
 3 applicants who are denied visas based on the Proclamation are automatically considered for a  
 4 waiver under section 3(c) of the Proclamation. *See State Dep’t Website.* Plaintiffs, in fact, admit  
 5 that many of the individuals who were granted consular interviews after the Proclamation went  
 6 into effect were given letters “notifying them that they had been denied a waiver and a visa.”  
 7 Complaint (Dkt. 1) ¶ 127. Plaintiffs also do not dispute that each visa applicant Plaintiff has been  
 8 informed of the denial, grant, or further consideration of a waiver.<sup>7</sup> *Id.* ¶¶ 163-254.  
 9 Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ desire that the State Department provide specific and formal  
 10 procedures for visa applicants to affirmatively submit unsolicited documents to consular officials  
 11 for consideration, neither regulation mandates such relief.  
 12

13 In short, where the Proclamation does not satisfy the three necessary requirements for  
 14 private enforceability, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a claim.  
 15 *See Haitian Refugee Ctr.*, 953 F.2d at 510-11.  
 16

17 **III. Plaintiffs fail to state a constitutional claim.**

18 Plaintiffs’ claim that the Proclamation violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth  
 19 Amendment also lacks merit. First, there is no fundamental right to reside in the United States with  
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21 <sup>7</sup> Plaintiffs also claim that a limited number of them or their family members had their visa  
 22 application interviews before the waiver process was implemented and thus were denied the  
 23 opportunity to present evidence related to their waiver eligibility during an interview. Complaint  
 24 (Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 171, 182, 187-88, 199, 212, 222, 227. Under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability,  
 25 this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a consular officer’s determination that a second interview  
 was not needed because he had sufficient information to adjudicate the visa applicant’s waiver  
 eligibility. *Li Hing*, 800 F.2d at 971.

26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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Case No. 2:18-cv-01122-JLR

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 CIVIL DIVISION, OIL DCS  
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1 noncitizen family members. Second, even assuming that certain plaintiffs had a protected liberty  
 2 or property interest, they would have been provided all the process that was due.

3 **A. Plaintiffs' due process claim fails because there is no fundamental right to  
 4 reside in the United States with non-citizen family members.**

5 Substantive due process protects those rights that rank as “fundamental”—that is, both  
 6 “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of  
 7 ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”  
 8 *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court  
 9 has also made clear that a plaintiff must provide “a ‘careful description’ of the asserted  
 10 fundamental liberty interest” when raising such a claim. *Chavez v. Martinez*, 538 U.S. 760, 775-76  
 11 (2003). “[V]ague generalities” do not suffice. *Id.* at 776.

12 Plaintiffs have not met and cannot meet that standard. First, “unadmitted and nonresident  
 13 alien[s]” have “no constitutional right of entry into the country.” *Mandel*, 408 U.S. at 762. Second,  
 14 the Ninth Circuit has recognized there is no “right to family unity” that allows one to reside in the  
 15 United States “simply because other members of their family are citizens or lawful permanent  
 16 residents.” *De Mercado v. Mukasey*, 566 F.3d 810, 816 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009); *see Sianipar v. Holder*,  
 17 584 F. App’x 353, 354 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting due process claim based on family unity  
 18 considerations); *see also Carrasco-Escobar v. Lynch*, 670 F. App’x 538 (9th Cir. 2016); *Mendoza-*  
 19 *Calvillo v. Holder*, 521 F. App’x 579 (9th Cir. 2013); *Luna-Mastache v. Holder*, 469 F. App’x  
 20 546, 547 (9th Cir. 2012).

21 In *Gebhardt v. Nielsen*, the plaintiff brought a substantive due process claim attacking the  
 22 denial of a visa petition filed on behalf of his non-citizen wife and her children, asserting that he

26 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

21  
 Case No. 2:18-cv-01122-JLR

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
 CIVIL DIVISION, OIL DCS  
 P.O. BOX 868, BEN FRANKLIN STATION  
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 TELEPHONE: (202) 532-4094

had a fundamental right to preserve the integrity of his family. 879 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 The Ninth Circuit rejected his claim, holding that “the generic right to live with family is far removed from the specific right to reside in the United States with non-citizen family members.”  
*Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The court in *Gebhardt* found that “a fundamental right to reside in the United States with [one’s] non-citizen relatives” “would “run[ ] headlong into Congress’ plenary power over immigration.” *Id.* Similarly, in *Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, the Ninth Circuit held that “lawfully denying plaintiff’s adjustment of status does not violate any of his or his family’s substantive rights protected by the Due Process Clause” even “when the impact of our immigration laws is to scatter a family or to require some United States citizen children to move to another country with their parent.” 600 F.3d 1076, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) *overruled in part on other grounds by Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder*, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Thus, where Plaintiffs posit that “United States citizens and lawful permanent residents have constitutionally protected liberty interests in family reunification and in the ability of their family members to travel to the United States,” Complaint (Dkt. 1) ¶ 304, they are roundly repudiated by the courts.

**B. Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim fails as any plaintiff with a protected liberty or property interest would have been accorded all the process that he or she was due.**

The Supreme Court has held that, for due process purposes, what might be described as a benefit “is not a protected entitlement”—whereas the former may be granted or denied in the discretion of a government official, the latter may not. *See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (holding that an individual did not have a property interest in police enforcement of a restraining order issued pursuant to state law). Plaintiffs’ procedural due process

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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 CIVIL DIVISION, OIL DCS  
 P.O. BOX 868, BEN FRANKLIN STATION  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20044  
 TELEPHONE: (202) 532-4094

1 claim fails because they do not have a liberty or property interest in the grant of one of the waivers  
 2 made available under the Proclamation to visa applicants on a case-by-case basis. Because those  
 3 waivers are purely discretionary, they qualify as benefits, and not as protected entitlements. *See,*  
 4 *e.g., Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch*, 840 F.3d 655, 665 (9th Cir. 2016) (aliens have no cognizable due  
 5 process interest in discretionary immigration relief); *Munoz v. Ashcroft*, 339 F.3d 950, 954  
 6 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).

7 As previously discussed, Plaintiffs also do not have a protected liberty or property interest  
 8 in family reunification that warrants any process. As “unadmitted and nonresident alien[s],” the  
 9 visa applicant plaintiffs in particular have “no constitutional right of entry into the country,”  
 10 *Mandel*, 408 U.S. at 762, and “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due  
 11 process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,” *Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. at 544. *See*  
 12 *Bustamante v. Mukasey*, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2008); *Li Hing*, 800 F.2d at 970.

14 Further, even assuming that a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident had any  
 15 protected liberty or property interest in being reunited with a foreign national family member,  
 16 Defendants afforded them all the process that was due by providing a statutory citation justifying  
 17 the visa denials. *Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. As the Supreme Court has held, “respect for the  
 18 political branches’ broad power over the creation and administration of the immigration system  
 19 mean[s] that the Government need provide only a statutory citation to explain a visa denial.” *Id.*  
 20 at 2419 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to  
 21 state an actionable procedural due process claim, and the Court should dismiss their Complaint.  
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26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

23  
 Case No. 2:18-cv-01122-JLR

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 CIVIL DIVISION, OIL DCS  
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1 **IV. Plaintiffs' general claims regarding the waiver assessment process, lack of guidance,**  
 2 **and supposed "mass form denials" are without merit.**

3 Even if review of the implementation of the Proclamation's waiver provision were  
 4 reviewable, Plaintiffs' claims targeting the waiver assessment process, issuance of guidance, and  
 5 supposed "mass form denials" are foreclosed by the express terms of the Proclamation, publicly  
 6 available information, the Supreme Court's decision in *Hawaii*, and the favorable adjudications of  
 7 waivers rendered by consular officers. Plaintiffs cannot plausibly contend that they were not  
 8 properly considered for a waiver in connection with their visa applications: Plaintiffs acknowledge  
 9 in their Complaint that each member of the putative Visa Member Subclass has been informed that  
 10 he had been refused a visa under the Proclamation and either that he was not eligible for a waiver  
 11 or that his case was being further considered for a waiver. While Plaintiffs ask this Court to order  
 12 Defendants to publicly issue guidance of some sort regarding the waiver provision and then to  
 13 reconsider all visa (and waiver) denials, their argument fundamentally misunderstands the waiver  
 14 process under the Proclamation and its requirements.

16 Although section 3(c) places the burden on the applicant to "demonstrate" that a waiver  
 17 would be appropriate, there is no process separate from the visa-application process by which  
 18 applicants "submit a waiver" under the Proclamation. *See* State Dep't Website. Instead, consistent  
 19 with publicly available guidance from the Department of State, *all* visa applicants who are refused  
 20 under the Proclamation are automatically considered for a waiver. *See id.* As the State Department  
 21 has publicly explained, in adjudicating visa applications, a consular officers assesses, as part of  
 22 normal visa processing, all the information an applicant submits at the interview to determine  
 23 whether the applicant has demonstrated eligibility for a discretionary waiver:

25  
 26 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

24  
 Case No. 2:18-cv-01122-JLR

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
 CIVIL DIVISION, OIL DCS  
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 WASHINGTON, DC 20044  
 TELEPHONE: (202) 532-4094

1 There is no separate application for a waiver. An individual who  
 2 seeks to travel to the United States should apply for a visa and  
 disclose during the visa interview any information that might  
 demonstrate that he or she is eligible for a waiver.

3 *Id.* Thus, Plaintiffs are able to rely on the Proclamation and public State Department guidance,  
 4 which set forth the waiver eligibility factors and provide examples of cases that may qualify for a  
 5 waiver. *See id.* (“The Proclamation provides several examples . . . of cases that may be appropriate  
 6 for consideration for a waiver, on a case-by-case basis, when in the national interest, when entry  
 7 would not threaten national security or public safety, and [when] denial would cause undue  
 8 hardship. Among the examples provided, a foreign national who seeks to enter the United States  
 9 for urgent medical care may be considered for a waiver.”); *see also* Proclamation, § 3(c)(iv)(A)  
 10 (listing examples of when a discretionary waiver might be appropriate.).

12 Under State Department guidance and without the need for a separate waiver application,  
 13 consular officers have continued to consider whether visa applicants around the world who are  
 14 covered by the Proclamation are eligible for a discretionary waiver. As previously mentioned, the  
 15 State Department reports that 1,836 waivers were granted as of September 30, 2018. *See* State  
 16 Dep’t Website. Plaintiffs cannot dispute that, in the short time since the Proclamation became  
 17 effective, the State Department has reviewed many thousands of visa applications and continues  
 18 to grant waivers. Many more applications are still awaiting review to ensure that the applicants  
 19 pose no risk to national-security or public-safety, which is a time-consuming process. Conclusory  
 20 assertions that the Government has a policy of “mass form denials” of waivers and has withheld  
 21 from Plaintiffs the opportunity to demonstrate eligibility for a waiver do not constitute a claim on  
 22 which relief can be granted.

25  
 26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

25  
 Case No. 2:18-cv-01122-JLR

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1           Further, nothing in the Proclamation imposes on the Government a duty to make public its  
 2 internal guidance to consular officers. Proclamation, § 3(c). The lack of such a requirement makes  
 3 sense in light of the sensitive nature of the instructions given to consular officers—the same reason  
 4 that some of the guidance to consular officers regarding visa application examinations is not  
 5 publicly available. *See* Ex. A at 6; *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (stating that the records of diplomatic  
 6 and consular offices pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas shall be considered confidential  
 7 and used only for the formulation or enforcement of laws, with limited exceptions, including crime  
 8 prevention). In any event, the guidance on the waiver process and the Proclamation’s requirements  
 9 which the State Department has already made public satisfies any possible claim that the  
 10 Proclamation requires information on the waiver process be made publicly available. *See* State  
 11 Dep’t Website.

13           Lastly, as to Plaintiffs’ indications that the number of waivers granted has been  
 14 unacceptably low, the Supreme Court in *Hawaii* expressly rejected arguments very similar to those  
 15 raised here about the paucity of waivers. *See Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2422-23. The Supreme Court  
 16 dismissed the relevance of “selective statistics” and “anecdotal evidence” to “suggest[ ] that not  
 17 enough individuals are receiving waivers or exemptions.” *Id.* at 2423 n.7; *see id.* at 2431-33  
 18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referencing the declaration of Christopher Richardson, attached to  
 19 Plaintiffs’ Complaint as Exhibit A). If this Court were to try to assay the statistical information  
 20 relating to waiver grants and determine whether the figures are in fact somehow too low, it would  
 21 have to judge the “correctness” of individual discretionary decisions rendered by consular officers,  
 22 a task that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability precludes the Court from undertaking.  
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26 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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Case No. 2:18-cv-01122-JLR

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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.

Dated: October 2, 2018

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DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

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## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on October 2, 2018, I filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court through the Court's ECF system and that the foregoing document will be served electronically upon registered participants identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing.

Dated: October 2, 2018

*/s/ David Kim*  
DAVID KIM  
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